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Project Vision 21

Transforming lives, renewing minds, cocreating the future


18 years      OF Archives

WEEKLY COMMENTARY (AUDIO, 4 MIN., AI generated)

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DISCLAIMER

The commentaries we share here are merely our thoughts and reflections at the time of their writing. They are never our final word about any topic, nor they necessarily guide our professional work. 

 

None of our projects will ever be completely finished.

The arrival of autumn calls for heading out into the yard to start gathering fallen leaves—a task I took on last weekend. While at it, I realized that, despite my wishes and best efforts, I could never collect every single leaf; there would always be some just beyond the reach of my rake.

This experience—facing a task that can never be fully completed, but rather ends only when one decides, "This is far enough; this will do"—reminded me of an article published by Benoît Mandelbrot in 1967, which seeks to answer the question: How long is the coastline of Great Britain? As it turns out, the answer is not as simple or straightforward as it might seem.

To put it simply, Mandelbrot proposed that there is no single, fixed length independent of the scale of measurement. In other words, the measured length of Great Britain’s coastline varies depending on whether you measure it in increments of 100 kilometers, 10 kilometers, 1 kilometer, 1 meter, or 1 centimeter.

Mandelbrot is not suggesting that we are ignorant of the coastline’s "true" length or incapable of measuring it; rather, he questions the very existence of a single, definitive numerical answer that remains independent of the method used.

This led me to consider that certain tasks—such as gathering every leaf or precisely measuring a coastline—remain forever incomplete. This is not a flaw in our knowledge or our actions, but an inevitable consequence of attempting to engage with reality using a single unit of measurement, even though reality itself presents us with varying levels of complexity.

Furthermore, this suggests that the concept of an "incomplete task" can be extended to the most significant endeavor within our reach: human existence itself. Following Heidegger—and, again, simplifying—we might say that our own life is a project that will, inevitably, remain unfinished.

According to Heidegger (for details, see paragraph 31 of Being and Time), human existence is projective in its very structure: it is always oriented toward possibilities of being. Therefore, as long as we live, we never fully coincide with a definitive, concluded identity. We are not merely what we have already been or what we currently are; we are also our as-yet-unrealized possibilities.

In paragraph 46 of the same work, Heidegger suggests that, while we live, our existence has not yet reached its end; yet, when that end arrives, we are no longer present to experience our existence as a completed whole. In other words, human existence is a project that, as long as it is being lived, is never entirely finished.

But there is something else to mention: the leaves one gathers are never all the leaves. There is always one left behind, even after the task is finished. The leaves keep falling. The task may be considered complete, but the process continues, and the world keeps unfolding even as we attempt to bring it into order.

Incompleteness does not diminish the meaning of life; rather, it is precisely what allows us to discover it.

What is hell like when "others" are no longer "hell"?

For some time now, I have frequently encountered people quoting—usually out of context—a well-known phrase by the French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre: "Hell is other people." But, given that the "other" is disappearing from our society, the question arises: what is a hell without "others" like?

Sartre included this phrase in No Exit (1944), a play in which three deceased characters—Garcin, Inès, and Estelle—find themselves confined together in a room devoid of mirrors, windows, or conventional instruments of physical torture. Gradually, they discover that their punishment in this "hell" consists of confronting an image of themselves, reflected through the judgments, desires, and interpretations of the other two.

Sartre laid out the philosophical framework for this perspective in Being and Nothingness (1943) when discussing "the look" (or the gaze). He distinguishes between "being-for-itself" (consciousness as freedom and an unfinished project), "being-for-others" (one’s existence as it appears to another consciousness), and "being-in-itself" (the mode of existence of inanimate objects).

In this context, we all eventually experience seeing ourselves not merely as the subjects of our own actions, but also as objects within someone else’s world—not just as the consciousness that gazes, but also as the person being gazed upon. And this is the central philosophical point: I cannot fully determine or control what I am to the "Other."

In 1965, Sartre clarified that his famous phrase does not imply that all relationships with others are inherently hellish; rather, it suggests that when relationships become distorted or corrupted, other people can indeed become a hell for us. He also emphasized that our self-understanding is profoundly mediated by the "Other"—that is, by what others know and think about us. Nowadays, the phrase “Hell is other people” is often used to suggest that other individuals are the root of the problem—that life would be better without them, that others are to blame for our miseries, and, ultimately, that this society and this world are a form of hell. Yet, Sartre takes the concept into a different dimension.

For him—at least in our interpretation—hell is not the mere existence of others. Rather, hell emerges when one’s own existence becomes trapped within the judgment of others, and one surrenders one’s freedom to the definitions others impose upon who one is. Sartre’s version of hell still necessitates the existence of the “Other.” But what happens when we expel the Other—as Byung-Chul Han proposed in 2016?

For Sartre, the Other threatens my freedom because they can perceive me in ways I cannot control. For Han, contemporary society increasingly avoids precisely this encounter with difference. In Sartre’s view, the Other is unbearably present; in Han’s view, the Other is increasingly absent.

The disappearance of the Other does not result in solitude, but rather in an identity that recognizes only itself—a hell devoid of both consciousness and hope.

What valuable things are we willing to lose for a moment of distraction?

Last week, while driving home, I passed along a narrow, two-lane street—one lane in each direction. Suddenly, a child—no more than three or four years old—ran out from the doorway of a house toward the road, stopping just before reaching the street itself. As a precaution, I brought my car to a stop, as did the driver coming from the opposite direction.

I must emphasize that the child was never in any real danger, though she certainly could have been had she stepped into the road, or had a distracted driver been passing by at that exact moment. None of that happened. The child immediately returned home in the arms of her father, who had desperately chased after her upon realizing the situation.

Although nothing happened and the matter was resolved without incident in a matter of seconds, the experience prompted some reflection. For instance, when a small child runs toward the street, it is because they are exploring the world; given their tender age, they have not yet developed an awareness of the dangers that lurk or the consequences of their own actions.

But what happens when an adult—chronologically speaking—does the same thing? Time and again, we see adults who “run out” into the world without the slightest concern for what they might encounter, and with even less regard for the impact their actions might have on themselves or others.

A young child who sees an open door and decides to run toward the street might be forgiven. But can we truly forgive someone who, while behaving like a child, displays complete irresponsibility—toward both themselves and others—in everything they do? In fact, for many people, the “other” has ceased to exist. Moreover, watching the father run after his daughter, I began to reflect on how we sometimes only start to appreciate the precious and valuable elements of our lives when we lose them—or when we are on the verge of losing them. When that happens, everything that previously commanded our attention not only fades into the background but effectively vanishes.

Let’s be honest: sooner or later, we will all experience irreparable losses in our lives. Yet, even though we know this, we don’t truly live by it—meaning we fail to live each moment with the intensity required to show the people around us just how valuable and important they are to us.

Another thought crossed my mind: what precious person in our life are we willing to put at risk because of a moment of distraction? In the case of the little girl mentioned earlier, someone was clearly distracted and left the house door open. A single moment of distraction, a lapse in attention, a slip-up—and suddenly we find ourselves running to avert a tragedy, if it can still be averted at all.

In a world where we live in a state of constant distraction, let us focus our attention on—and show proper regard for—what we truly value.

Social esteem runs the risk of becoming a computational function

For several decades now—perhaps even centuries—our culture and society have come to accept that the question "What is this?" actually means "What is this for?" Consequently, if one encounters a new artifact and asks what it is, the answer almost inevitably begins with "It’s for..."—thereby conflating the very nature of a thing with its utility.

In this way, it is assumed that everything that exists must serve a purpose; that the "true" and the "useful" are equivalent; and, by extension, that anything not useful—anything useless—must, by definition, be false. Yet, to be honest, this almost innate tendency to fuse "being" with "being useful" is not limited merely to objects or artifacts.

For instance, when I told my friends (decades ago) that I intended to pursue philosophy, the most common follow-up question was: "What for? It’s good for nothing." Even today, people still ask me what philosophy is "for"—as if utilitarian value constituted the very essence of a thing’s existence.

In this same vein, many universities and schools are casting aside the disciplines traditionally known as the humanities, dismissing them as studies that lead to no clear career path—in other words, as "useless"—as if becoming an employee were the ultimate, unquestionable goal of human existence. But there is something even worse than believing that utility reveals the true nature of being.

Half a century ago, Erich Fromm published *To Have or to Be?*, a book in which he explores two fundamental modes of human existence: the "having" mode (focused on material possessions) and the "being" mode (focused on experiences). Both modes are necessary for human life. Problems arise when they are confused—or, worse yet, when "being" is reduced to "having." I recall a professor who, while explaining the ideas of Fromm, noted that we once loved people and used things, whereas now we do the opposite. In this context, what could be worse than deeming an object—or a university degree—useless? Perhaps considering a person useless simply because they do not “fit” into today’s society.

This is nothing new. As early as 1961, the series The Twilight Zone anticipated this scenario in one of its finest episodes, “The Obsolete Man,” starring Burgess Meredith. Even earlier, in 1915, Kafka warned that being deemed useless by society can rapidly transform us into loathsome insects, stripping away our very humanity.

Yet, there is something far worse than a human being being labeled obsolete or useless by their own society: having that judgment rendered by an algorithm. This is precisely the argument put forth by Min Tang and Jinqi Yan in a recent academic paper, in which they contend that it is now algorithms that determine our social utility.

“To be respected no longer means to be considered meaningful; it simply means being computed (algorithmically) as relevant,” the paper concludes—chillingly.

Everyday life experiences could foreshadow the possibility of a collapse

Two recent life experiences led me to think that perhaps we should rethink our relationship with new technologies, to which, I believe, we give too much authority over our lives and in which we place too much trust.

It turns out that a few days ago I called my bank to verify a transaction. After dialing an endless series of numbers on the menu to get where I wanted to go, an automated voice asked me to briefly explain the reason for my call. I did so, but the response I received surprised me and left a bad taste in my mouth.

After the traditional “One moment, please,” the automated voice told me, “Your call is not important. Please consider calling back later.” And the connection was disconnected. I was left thinking that if I call, it's because the call is important to me, but based on my brief description of my call, the algorithm, without explanation, didn't consider it so.

That same week, an acquaintance mentioned that he started receiving birthday wishes on social media, even though it wasn't his actual birthday. But the worst part was that when he tried to explain, people seemed to believe the social media error more than his explanation.

These two ordinary incidents led me to think that people are increasingly relying on technological systems rather than on the testimonies, experiences, and culture of other people, and that both individuals and organizations and companies are frequently delegating decisions about humans to AI that were previously the sole responsibility of other humans.

We are thus faced with a double crisis: the crisis of trust (trust has shifted from humans to technology) and the crisis of authority (systems increase their authority while the authority of human decisions weakens). As a result, a third crisis emerges: the crisis of meaning, analyzed by Habermas and, more recently, by Vervaeke.

Ultimately, human concerns (paying a bill, celebrating a birthday) take a back seat and are subsumed by the efficiency of a non-human system (although created by humans).

As Heidegger had already anticipated, we think technologically; that is, we understand reality not through human experience, but through technology.

We are, therefore, in a perfect storm (to use a metaphor so often repeated): a migration of trust, an 180-degree epistemological shift, a growing dependence on technology, and a crisis of meaning. Even worse, as these elements interact, each one intensifies the others.

For all these reasons, perhaps this is the moment for philosophy to return to everyday life, something that Socrates undoubtedly exemplified (see the Meno and the Apology). Ultimately, philosophy is the ability to see the invisible in the visible, to perceive the profound in the ordinary, to anticipate collapse in the everyday.

The future may need to be heard before it can be imagined

During the past few months, I have heard several people say, in different ways, essentially the same thing: “I had to put my life on hold” or “My dreams are now on the back burner” due to good or bad circumstances in their lives that forced them to abandon, but not to forget, the future they once imagined.

I understand those feelings because I experienced them myself several times. However, it seems to me that the number of people whose lives are “on hold” keeps growing. Therefore, I began wondering what exactly happens when we put our lives “on hold.” It seems to me that, consciously or not, we erroneously transform our present into just a waiting room for the future.

Let’s be honest: nobody enters the waiting room because they want to be there. We are there waiting for somebody to call our name so we complete whatever we need to do there so we can finally go somewhere else. Perhaps, then, we assume life works the same way: when this problem ends or when circumstances improve, then I will be able to resume my life.

The problem is that life continues while we wait. Even more importantly, perhaps our wait is based on confusing the unknown with the impossible. That confusion will keep us waiting for something that will never arrive.

British philosopher Tim Freke uses the word “pastivity” to describe, broadly speaking, how accumulated information from the past creates patterns that continue operating in the present. I find the concept increasingly useful. Our memories, experiences, successes, failures, fears and expectations continuously tell us what is reasonable, probable and possible.

Pastivity, Freke says, can become something like an algorithm. Perhaps that explains why we so easily confuse the unknown with the impossible. “I don't know how this could happen” quietly becomes “this cannot happen.” We reach the edge of our mental map and conclude that we have reached the edge of the territory.

Otto Scharmer's Theory U proposes something radically different: instead of learning exclusively from the past, we can learn from the emerging future. At the bottom of the familiar U-shaped arrow that illustrates Scharmer's Theory U there is a gap between “letting go” and “letting come.”

In other words, there is no direct connection between the past and the future. So, what kind of nothingness is that gap? It is, I think, the nothingness of silence, but not in the sense of eliminating noise. When it rains continuously, after a while I no longer hear the rain. The clock keeps ticking even after I stop noticing the tick-tock. Perhaps silence works similarly.

The noise of the past does not disappear. My biography remains my biography. My failures remain failures and my wounds remain wounds. I approach silence as a disposition in which the past remains present without retaining the authority to determine what happens next.

We need silence to listen to the emerging future because the future needs to be heard before it can be imagined.

 

The Reality That Was Once Unreachable Has Now Become Invisible

During my years as a university philosophy professor, I would often ask my students to complete the following exercise: think of a psychological dream they had had, describe that dream in writing, read the text aloud, and, finally, share the dream dialogically with another person. Before long, they discovered that they had created four different realities.

With a little reflection, the students could clearly see that the images of their dreams, as they existed within their minds, were not adequately reflected in the text they themselves had written. At the same time, the text changed when it was read aloud, and later the narrative also differed—sometimes considerably—from the dream, the written text, and the reading.

In some cases, the students were astonished that there could be so many seemingly insurmountable discrepancies among thinking, writing, reading, and narrating. Some of the more perceptive students then began to suspect—quite rightly—that thinking, writing, reading, and narrating do not necessarily bring us closer to reality.

As Kant might put it, the “thing in itself” remains beyond our reach because the conditions that make the objects of experience possible are the same conditions that make our experience of those objects possible. In other words, we do not experience reality itself, but rather what we are capable of perceiving of reality.

And we can go one step further. Some of the students who truly took the time to reflect on these questions discovered that, in writing, reading, and narrating, we were in fact playing with language, without that necessarily meaning that, through language, we were describing anything about “real reality” or moving any closer to it.

Here we have to turn to Wittgenstein and his preoccupation with the difficulties of language. His famous “beetle in the box” thought experiment, presented in his 1953 Philosophical Investigations, questions the idea of a private language and the way we understand inner experiences such as pain—or, in the case of the exercise described above, our own dreams.

Ultimately, whether we like it or not, reality remains beyond our reach. It escapes us; it evaporates. Even as it reveals itself, it conceals more than it reveals. But now, in our hypertechnologized and hyperconnected age, we face yet another level of separation from reality: the omnipresent screens.

The walls covered with shadows in Plato’s famous Allegory of the Cave have now become screens filled with memes that, like the prisoners in the cave, have chained us to seeing the “reality” presented to us as though it were the whole of reality. The reduction of reality has become so extreme that we no longer dream, write, read, or narrate.

“We are servants or vassals: techno-vassals, techno-servants,” warned Spanish philosopher Javier Echeverría during a recent conference in Montevideo, emphasizing that our idea of reality “no longer corresponds” to reality itself. “I call this ‘mental techno-colonialism,’” he explained.

The reality that was once unreachable has now become invisible.

Is there real hope for our future, or is it merely fiction?

To mark the 60th anniversary of the premiere of Star Trek in September 1966, numerous documentaries were released regarding the creation and impact of that renowned science fiction series. One of these documentaries bore a title that prompted reflection: Star Trek: Hope.

It is true that Star Trek—both the original series and its successors—presents a hopeful vision of humanity’s future, characterized by advanced technology, cooperation among humans and with beings from other planets, intellectual curiosity, and respect for differences. In every episode, viewers "inhabited" that hopeful future.

But can a fictional future depicted in a science fiction TV series translate into real hope? And if so—or at least if some people claim it does—how is that possible? Is it because we live in such a turbulent world that reality no longer offers hope, compelling us to seek it in fiction instead?

At the same time, we must bear in mind that a fictional future is not a historical prediction. Technological advancements do not guarantee ethical maturity, and six decades of history do not demonstrate that a society akin to the Federation is taking shape. We must distinguish between the expectation that evidence points toward a desired outcome and an uncertain wish for the future.

Nevertheless, with sixty years of stories and numerous series and films behind it, Star Trek continues to offer us hope: the hope that we will not lose our capacity to ask questions about how we ought to treat one another right now. Its imagined civilization can serve as a model for examining our current institutions and behaviors.

Therefore, we must distinguish between fictional hope and hope mediated by fiction. Believing the Federation is inevitable simply because it appears on screen confuses imagination with evidence. Allowing one’s imagined practices of cooperation and dignity to inspire actual conduct yields real consequences, without the need to believe in their literal arrival.

A difficult question then arises: how long can a sense of hope be sustained when its object remains beyond the horizon?

A prediction must be tested against evidence and may need to be abandoned when its foundations fail. An ethical orientation can endure without a timetable, yet it risks becoming a substitute for the future it originally promised. Six decades? Twenty centuries? At what point does hope transform into indefinite delay?

Fictional inspiration should not—in my view—turn every disappointment into proof that fulfillment is secretly drawing nearer. Hope becomes self-indulgent when reality can no longer challenge the narrative sustaining it—even while acknowledging that science fiction, mythology, and theology all employ stories to make an inaccessible world imaginable.

Thus, the question is not merely whether the longed-for future will one day arrive, but rather what enables or prevents the arrival of the future we anticipate.

The Catastrophic Potential of the Seemingly Normal

I recently had to repair a section of the irrigation system in front of my house because tree roots decided to “strangle” (metaphorically speaking) the plastic pipe carrying the irrigation water. The repairs were simple, but I was struck by the fact that the interaction between root and pipe had been going on for about 20 years before reaching its climax.

I reached this conclusion by considering when the tree was planted and when the irrigation system was installed. Over those two decades, the root and the pipe coexisted in close proximity, slowly drawing nearer to one another until, one day, they made contact. Initially, nothing happened, but over time, the root began to crush the pipe.

The entire drama unfolded underground. No one witnessed the slow approach, the first crack in the pipe, or the moment it snapped in two. The tragic end of the “friendship” between root and pipe only became apparent when water began pooling on the surface, revealing that something had gone wrong.

This situation made me reflect on how (again, metaphorically speaking) similar scenarios play out in real life. We begin to coexist with something or someone, sometimes for decades, drawing ever closer day by day, without realizing we are in danger—that this closeness to “the other,” which we deemed safe, is actually anything but.

Let’s be honest: many of us have experienced someone entering our lives, initially keeping a respectful distance, then becoming a constant presence, only to discover, when it is already too late, that the person harbors truly harmful intentions.

Yet, it is not always about a person. Sometimes it involves a behavior or a habit that initially seems normal and harmless; over time, it very slowly gains our trust until one day—without us even noticing—it begins to crush us, eventually “suffocating” us (so to speak). And in this instance, the damage can rarely be undone.

While examples abound, they are unnecessary here. We have all known or experienced situations where something—initially appearing harmless, positive, or even appealing—draws close, wins our trust, and becomes part of our lives, only to eventually (whether intentionally or not) reveal its true nature.

In some cases, this “revelation” occurs quickly—sometimes within minutes—such as at the end of a sales pitch or when someone says, “Don’t worry, I’ll help you.” In other instances, decades may pass before a person or a habit makes it clear that, from the very start, they harbored specific plans that did not take our well-being into account.

Obviously, I am not suggesting that we should constantly distrust every relationship or habit. However, we must not mistake “closeness” for safety or good intentions.

Trust has shifted from the human realm to the artificial. And this affects us.

Trust in one another and in traditional institutions has eroded significantly—if it exists at all—and on this point, we must all agree. The challenge lies in the fact that, as philosopher and historian Yuval Noah Harari maintains, trust is a key element in the existence of human civilization. If trust migrates, we change.

This is not merely a theoretical matter; concrete examples abound—perhaps excessively so—in our daily lives. Recently, I was driving along a three-lane road with the traffic light in my favor when a family intentionally decided to cross the street slowly, forcing astonished drivers to slam on their brakes.

This example could be extended to every sphere and level—schools, universities, courts, governments, scientific institutions, banks, and the media, to name a few. When trust is lost in the system that enables cooperation with strangers, civilization begins to fracture (Harari, Sapiens, 2011 and Nexus, 2024).

In a recent article, Dr. Miguel De La Torre (an ethicist and theologian) shares his own experience with what might be termed the "destabilization of trust"—a phenomenon that occurs when entities that once held authority lose it because they have lost their credibility. De La Torre cites specific cases, such as the U.S. National Weather Service.

According to this theologian, "When a people no longer believe in its rulers, when a people no longer trust its government’s rules and regulations, there remains nothing holding them together." At that point—I would add—trust has not only been destabilized but has also shifted to family and friends, though increasingly to social media and AI.

When trust turns into mistrust, knowledge becomes uncertain. When this happens and no credible alternatives emerge—that is, when we reach the level of a global crisis of meaning (John Vervaeke)—trust, in my view, migrates beyond the human realm and shifts toward the artificial.

I am not suggesting that people now “trust” AI (although that may be true); rather, I believe AI’s epistemic authority has grown in response to the rising distrust in traditional leaders and institutions. AI systems did not suddenly acquire extraordinary capabilities; instead, other previously trusted connections lost that trust.

In an article published in May of this year, American sociologist and anthropologist Steven L. Arxer states that we are living in an era of “differentiated trust”—a time when people “grant credibility selectively” to various authorities on different issues based on institutional experience, political identity, and the information environment.

According to Arxer, unless this “competition between authorities” is resolved, human collaboration cannot begin—an idea similar to those previously expressed by Harari and De La Torre. Trust never disappears; it searches for somewhere else to reside.

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